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Abstract We examine the predictive ability, the consistency properties, and the possible 
driving forces of inflation expectations, using a survey conducted in Spain by PwC, among a 
panel of experts and entrepreneurs. When analysing the headline inflation rate, our results 
suggest that the PwC panel has some forecasting ability for time horizons from 3 to 9 months, 
improving when it comes to predicting the core inflation rate. Nevertheless, the results indicate 
that predictions made by survey participants are neither unbiased nor efficient predictors of 
future inflation rates, regardless of the measures of inflation used. As for the consistency 
properties of the inflation expectations formation process, we find that panel members form 
stabilising expectations in the case of the headline inflation rate, both in the short and in the 
long‑run, although in the case of the core inflation rate, consistency remains indeterminate. 
Finally, we find that inflation expectations are very persistent and that they appear to 
incorporate the information content of some macroeconomic variables (current core 
inflation and growth rate, the USD/EUR exchange rate, the European Central Bank (ECB) infla‑
tion target, and changes in the ECB official short‑term interest rate).
© 2013 Asociación Cuadernos de Economía. Published by Elsevier España, S.L. All rights reserved.
Expectativas de inflación en España: la encuesta PwC española 
Resumen Examinamos la capacidad predictiva, las propiedades de consistencia de las 
expectativas de inflación y sus posibles determinantes usando una encuesta a un panel de 
expertos y empresarios realizada en España por PwC. Al analizar la tasa de inflación general, 
nuestros resultados sugieren que el panel de PwC presenta alguna capacidad predictiva para los 
horizontes temporales desde 3 a 9 meses, mejorando cuando se trata de predecir la tasa de 
inflación subyacente. Sin embargo, los resultados indican que las predicciones realizadas por los 
participantes de la encuesta no son predictores insesgados ni eficientes de las tasas de inflación 
futuras, con independencia de las medidas de inflación empleadas. En cuanto a las propiedades 
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1. Introduction
Inflation expectations are at the centre of modern macro‑
economic theory and monetary policy (see, e. g., Gali, 
2008, and Sims, 2009). Virtually all macro‑economic models 
are built on the assumption that agents maximize expected 
utility under a well defined distribution representing their 
inflation beliefs. In addition, inflation expectations are 
used by central banks to gain an insight into the private 
sector’s assessment of the outlook for future inflation and 
to evaluate perceptions on the credibility of monetary 
policy.1
Despite the prominence and the ample use of expec-
tations, the evidence about how people form their 
expectations and why they disagree is very scarce. The 
basic problem of the expectations approach to forecasting 
is how to uncover market participants’ expectations, since 
this variable is in fact latent (it cannot be directly observed). 
Existing measurements of inflation expectations may be 
partitioned into two broad categories depending on whether 
they are direct or indirect. Indirect measurements are 
inferred from either financial instruments (such as the 
Treasury Inflation‑Protected Security), the term structure of 
interest rates, or past realizations of inflations rates. Direct 
methods of measuring expectations typically rely on some 
sort of survey in which certain subsamples of the population 
are asked to reveal their personal expectations. 
Empirical studies often show that inflation forecasts of 
professional economists influence expectations of those 
agents who are not experienced in macroeconomic forecasts 
(e.g. Carroll, 2003; Döepke et al., 2008). Although the 
rationality of survey forecasts has been debated (Croushore, 
1998), they are generally well regarded, especially the 
forecasts made by the professionals. Indeed, there is some 
empirical evidence suggesting that median responses 
generally track official estimates of realized inflation, 
sometimes even outperforming professional forecasters 
(see, Hafer & Hein, 1985; Thomas, 1999, and Ang et al., 
2007, among others). Ang et al. (2007) argue that the 
superior performance of survey forecasts could be related 
to the fact that the surveys simply aggregate information 
from many different sources, not captured by a single 
model.
1. Bernanke et al. (2001) discuss how the behaviour of survey fo-
recasts relative to the central bank’s inflation target provides infor-
mation on credibility.
In this paper, we examine the predictive ability and 
consistency of expectations on the inflation rate based on 
the quarterly survey conducted by the Spanish branch of 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), as well as the possible 
driving forces behind the expectation formation process. 
Our sample consists of thirty surveys covering the period 
from 2003:II to 2011:III.
We consider that the theme of our paper is of interest in 
two aspects: from the economic agents’ perspectives, 
where inflation expectations are relevant in decision 
making, looking for maximise expected utility, and from the 
side of the study of communication strategies of central 
banks, inflation forecast targeting, and their credibility 
(see, e. g. Mishkin, 2006).
Regarding this second aspect, a relevant feature of 
modern central banks is the change in communication 
strategies (Bûlir et al., 2008). Market participants use 
interest rate decisions as well as communication of the 
central bank to infer the future path of monetary policy. 
Studies like those of Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007, 2009) 
and Lamla and Lein (2011) explore the importance of 
central bank communication relative to the announced 
interest rate decision for guiding money markets. While 
monitoring market interest rates, they find that the 
information provided by the press conference is very 
relevant. Conrad and Lamla (2010) and Hayo and Neuenkirch 
(2012) found effects of central bank communication on 
other markets like bonds, stocks and foreign exchange 
rates.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the 
data. In Section 3 the forecast accuracy of the survey is 
assessed. Section 4 examines the consistency properties of 
the inflation rate expectation formation process of short 
and long forecasts. In Section 5 we explore the role of 
potential determining factors in explaining the expectation 
formation process revealed by the panel. Finally, in Section 
6 some concluding remarks are offered.
2. The survey data
Since 1999, the Spanish branch of PwC has been conducting 
a quarterly survey on the Spanish economic situation. One 
of the questions refers to inflation rate expectations. Survey 
participants are asked in the last week prior to quarter’s 
end to deliver three and nine- month-ahead expectations, 
or six and twelve‑ month‑ahead expectations of the inflation 
rate. The dates when the surveys were conducted have 




de la consistencia del proceso de formación de las expectativas de la tasa de inflación general, 
obtenemos que los panelistas forman sus expectativas de forma estabilizadoras, tanto en el 
corto como en el largo plazo. Al centrarse en la tasa de inflación subyacente, la consistencia 
queda indeterminada. Por último, obtenemos que las expectativas de inflación son muy 
persistentes y que parecen incorporar la información contenida en algunas variables 
macroeconómicas (las tasas actuales de inflación subyacente y de crecimiento real, el tipo de 
cambio USD/EUR, el objetivo de inflación del BCE y los cambios en el tipo de interés a corto 
plazo del BCE).
© 2013 Asociación Cuadernos de Economía. Publicado por Elsevier España, S.L. Todos los derechos 
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observed, 3‑, 6‑, 9‑, and 12‑month ahead inflation rates 
computing from the overall Consumer Price Index (CPI), 
taking from the National Statistics Institute (Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística (INE)).
The PwC survey is based upon the opinion of panels of 
experts and entrepreneurs. The panel members cover the 
following sectors: non‑financial corporations (an average 
of 32.22% of respondents), universities and economic 
research centres (24.26%), financial system (21.48%), 
business and professional associations (17.31%) and 
institutions (4.65%). The number of participants of the 
survey varies from 95 in the third quarter of 2009 to 156 in 
the fourth quarter of 2004, with 118 being the average 
number of participants.
One important feature of the Spanish PwC panel is the 
anonymity of forecasters. Although the names of the panel 
participants are provided for each survey, it is not possible 
to know the answers of each person, so the researcher 
cannot follow the forecasts of a particular panel member 
over time. Nevertheless, this anonymity could encourage 
people to provide their best forecasts, without fearing the 
consequences of making forecast errors.
We concentrate on the 3‑, 6‑, 9‑ and 12‑month ahead 
forecasts, using 30 of the 33 surveys available.2 On average, 
the number of survey participants who responded to our 
question of interest was 115, reaching its minimum value of 
90 people in 2009:III and its maximum value of 154 people in 
2004: IV. 
3. Forecast accuracy
We initially evaluated the forecasting performance of the 
PwC panel in explaining headline inflation using the root 
mean square error (RMSE) and the Theil inequality 
coefficient. Additionally, we also consider the decomposition 
of the mean squared forecast error in its bias, variance and 
covariance proportions in order to assess, respectively, how 
2. We do not have enough information for the question of the in-
flation rate for the surveys corresponding to the third quarter of 
2007, the first quarter of 2008 and finally the third quarter of 2010.
far the mean of the forecast is from the mean of the actual 
series, how far the variation of the forecast is from the 
variation of the actual series, and how large is the remaining 
unsystematic forecasting errors.
Panel A in Table 1 shows the forecasting performance of 
our panel in tracking evolution of the overall CPI for 3‑, 6‑, 
9‑ and 12‑month ahead. As can be seen, the RMSE is large 
and increases with the forecast horizon, which means that 
forecasters have made mistakes in their predictions and 
make it worse as we move away from the temporal horizon. 
This finding is reinforced using the Theil inequality 
coefficient, since it is not close to zero. This result could be 
related to the following theoretical explanation on the longer 
time horizon, the closer the forecast to the target. Indeed, 
even when the European Central Bank and the central banks 
of the member states that belong to the eurozone are not 
considered explicit inflation targeters, they have set the 
primary objective of maintaining price stability, defined as 
inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium 
term. It has been noted that a central bank operating within 
explicit inflation targets, sets monetary policy instruments, 
as such that the expected value of inflation equals the 
inflation target (in this case below, but close to 2%). This 
depends on the information that economic agents have 
regarding central bank actions. If agents have complete 
information about the strategy of monetary policy applied 
by the central bank, they will expect an inflation level 
close to the inflation target. In this case, agents will not 
make systematic forecast errors (Capistran & Ramos‑
Francia, 2010). In this sense, if the central bank is 
credible, medium‑term inflation expectations (two years 
ahead) should be anchored to the target or nearby. That 
is, the longer the inflation forecasts time horizon (closer 
to medium‑term), the closer the inflation expectations to 
the target. Medium‑term expectations will depend less on 
cyclical economic factors and more on the central bank 
credibility. 
As for the bias proportion, since it is always zero, it 
suggests no systematic error in the forecasts of the PwC 
panel. The estimated variance proportion indicates a 
notable ability of the forecasts to replicate the degree of 
variability in the inflation rate, at least for the horizons 
k=3 and 6. For these forecasting horizons, the bias and 
Table 1 Forecast accuracy








Panel A: Headline inflation
  3-month ahead 0.972937 0.166897 0.004262 0.063673 0.932064
  6‑month ahead 1.054963 0.197166 0.063899 0.011847 0.924255
  9-month ahead 1.579039 0.290485 0.023790 0.141639 0.834571
 12-month ahead 1.703497 0.310188 0.045373 0.089201 0.865427
Panel B: Core inflation
  3-month ahead 0.565846 0.117376 0.015627 0.000036 0.984336
  6‑month ahead 0.538645 0.118828 0.016251 0.000012 0.983737
  9-month ahead 0.830764 0.183802 0.005659 0.098943 0.895398
 12-month ahead 0.903056 0.201881 0.017680 0.048886 0.933434
RMSE, root mean square error.
112 M.C. Ramos‑Herrera, S. Sosvilla‑Rivero
variance proportions are small, so that most of the bias is 
concentrated on the covariance proportions (i.e., in the 
unsystematic error). In other words, the mistakes made by 
panel members are not deterministic, in particular, the 
deviation of inflation rate prediction with respect to 
the actual value is random.
In economic applications the forecast user is often 
interested in directional (up/downward) movements of the 
variable under analysis. To assess if the PwC panel is able to 
predict more accurately than a random walk direction of 
headline inflation movements, we have also computed the 
percentage of correct predictions. As can be seen in Panel A 
of Table 2, panel participants correctly forecast the 
change of the inflation rate in 58.82% of the cases for 
k=3 and 9 and in 61.54% of the cases for k=6, 12.Therefore, 
panel forecasts are clearly outperforming the random walk 
directional forecasts in all horizons.
Therefore, the evidence presented in Panels A of 
Tables 1 and 2 suggests that the PwC panel has some 
forecasting ability in tracking the evolution of the headline 
inflation in Spain, at least until 9‑months ahead.
Blinder and Reis (2005) argue that it is better to predict 
headline inflation using lagged core (rather than headline) 
inflation. To explore the possibility that the participants in 
the PwC panel could be paying less attention to headline 
inflation data, but still be relying heavily on core inflation 
data, we have assessed the forecast accuracy and the 
directional forecast behaviour of the inflation expectations 
when forecasting core inflation. Panel B in Tables 1 and 
2 show the results.
As can be seen, there is a general improvement in both 
the RMSE statistic, the Theil inequality coefficient, and in 
the directional forecasts. Surprisingly, forecasts of headline 
inflation are rather good forecasts of core inflation. 
Therefore, our results seem to suggest that the panel 
participants may be implicitly forecasting the core inflation 
rate, instead of the headline inflation rate (which is what 
they are asked to forecast).
As a further assessment of the accuracy of the forecasts 
made by the PwC panel, we tested the hypothesis that the 
panel forecasts are optimal predictors of future inflation 
rates. If the forecasts made by panel participants are 
unbiased and efficient predictors of the future inflation 
rate, a regression of the observed inflation rate at time t+k 
(pt+k) on the expected rate determined at time t for 
k-periods ahead (pet+k).
pt+k = a + bpet+k + «t+k (1)
should result in an estimated constant (a^) not significantly 
different from zero, and an estimated coefficient on the 
expected rate (b^) not significantly different from one. 
Table 3 presents the estimation results and the Wald test on 
the joint hypothesis: H0: a^ = 0, b^ = 1. Moreover, Grant and 
Thomas (1999) contend that this hypothesis can be used to 
verify the existence of “weak form of rationality” since the 
rational expectations hypothesis does not require the 
forecasts to be strictly correct in all periods but, instead, 
requires the forecast errors to be unbiased and uncorrelated 
with any information in which the forecast is conditioned 
(see Clements, 2005).
As can be seen, the results suggest that we can deci‑
sively reject the null hypothesis for all forecast horizons, 
indicating that such forecasts are biased and not efficient 
predictors of the future inflation rate, regardless of the 
inflation measures (headline or core inflation) used as 
observed inflation rate. Therefore, our results support a 
“weak form of rationality” for the PwC panel base‑inflation 
expectations, partially reflecting the degree of sophis-
Table 2 Directional forecast
Panel A: Headline inflation
  3-month ahead 58.82
  6‑month ahead 61.54
  9-month ahead 58.82
 12-month ahead 61.54
Panel B: Core inflation
  3-month ahead 82.35
  6‑month ahead 76.92
  9-month ahead 76.47
 12-month ahead 76.92
Table 3 Forecast optimality
 3-month ahead 6‑month ahead 9-month ahead 12-month ahead
Panel A: Headline inflation
 a^ 0.612682 (0.0000) 1.906420 (0.0000) 2.535416 (0.0000) 3.452318 (0.0000)
 b^ 0.754766 (0.0000) 0.299054 (0.0000) 0.044489 (0.1611) −0.258337 (0.0000)
 Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.161124 0.0000
 Wald F-test 86.34462 (0.0000) 744.6454 (0.0000) 454.0752 (0.0000) 700.3444 (0.0000)
 No. of observations 1937 1504 1937 1504
Panel B: Core inflation
 a^ 0.691741 (0.0000) 0.700064 (0.0000) 1.030993 (0.0000) 1.458905 (0.0000)
 b^ 0.586298 (0.0000) 0.565421 (0.0000) 0.429859 (0.0000) 0.297322 (0.0000)
 Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
 Wald F-test 1272.243 (0.0000) 1104.672 (0.0000) 798.0567 (0.0000) 632.5904 (0.0000)
 No. of observations 1937 1504 1937 1504
Notes: p‑values in parenthesis.
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tication of the models and frameworks used by the Spanish 
market agents when forming their inflation expectations.
4. Expectation consistency
According to Froot and Ito (1989), consistency of 
expectations formed at the same point in time prevails if 
expectations about inflation rate changes during subsequent 
shorter time periods and expectations about the inflation 
rate for the entire time period give the same result. Note 
that consistency is a necessary condition if expectations are 
to be rational, but is weaker than rationality since it does 
not require that the expectation process matches the 
stochastic process, generating actual inflation rates.
Following Frankel and Froot (1987a, 1987b) and Frenkel 
et al. (2012), we assume that inflation rate forecasters build 
their expectations by using an extrapolative model which 
can, in its simplest form, be expressed as a distributed lag 
function with one lag:
Et,i(pt+k) − pt = ak + bk(pt−1 − pt) + «t,i (2)
where pt and Et,i(pt+k) denote, respectively, the inflation 
rate at time t and the expected inflation rate for time t+k 
made by forecaster i at time t. Subscript k denotes the 
forecast horizon and ε the error term. 
A positive bk indicates that with a slowdown in price growth 
during the period preceding the time of the forecast leads 
panel members to expect an opposite effect for the next 
period. Therefore, they will expect that the inflation rate in 
t+k exceeds t, expectations being in this case stabilising. On 
the contrary, if bk is negative, and in the preceding period 
forecasters observe that the rate at which prices grow is less, 
then they expect that the inflation rate in t+k is less than t, 
expectations being in this case destabilising.
Note that in our survey data gathers the participants’ 
expectations at different horizons at the same point of time, 
the information set available to the agent being the same, 
therefore allowing us to formally estimate (2) for such 
forecasting horizons. Table 4 reports the results. As can be 
seen in Panel A, the short-run bk and the long-run bk are 
positive for both time horizons (3 and 9 months and 6 and 
12 months), indicating that survey participants form 
stabilising expectations in the short-run and in the long-run 
when forecasting headline inflation. This result suggests that 
we should not reject the null hypothesis that short‑run 
forecasts are consistent with long‑run forecasts. As for the 
forecasting of core inflation, results in Panel B. In this case, 
the estimated betas do not coincide in sign, either in the 
short or in the long term. Regarding the long term, on the one 
hand, facing a reduction in the core inflation rate, the PwC 
panel expects a higher core inflation rate nine months later 
compared with the current rate (since the estimated beta is 
positive). On the other hand, if the panel participants observe 
that the core inflation rate in the month of the survey is 
lower than that in the previous month, they predict that this 
reduction will be further strengthened after twelve months, 
being therefore, destabilising expectations. While consistency 
is inde terminate in the long run, the situation does not 
change when we focus on the short term. The reason is that 
when facing a reduction in the inflation rate, the PwC panel 
forms destabilising expectations and, although the estimated 
beta for k = 3 also appears with a negative sign, it is not 
statistically significant and, after taking the constant out of 
the regression, the estimated beta experiences a change of 
sign, implying stabilising expectations.
5. Determining factors of the inflation 
expectations
To shed further light on the expectation formation process, 
in this section we explore the role of some variables as 
driving factors behind the inflation expectations declared 
by the PwC panel. In particular, we assessed the significance 
of the following potential determing factors: the inflation 
target of the European Central Bank (ECB) (proxied as 2%), 
nominal exchange rate (USD/EUR), real growth (proxied by 
the growth rate of the industrial production index), core 
inflation rate, changes in the ECB official interest rate and 
lagged inflation expectations. Note that information 
regarding these variables is always available at the time the 
expectations are formed.
pet+k = ptarget,t + a1st + a2rt + a3pcore,t + a4Di + a5pet+k−1 + «t+k (3)
Table 4 Expectation formation processes
 3-month ahead 6‑month ahead 9-month ahead 12-month ahead
Panel A: Headline inflation
 a^ −0.143692 (0.0000) −0.193739 (0.0000) −0.157764 (0.0000) −0.250228 (0.0000)
 b^ 0.919159 (0.0000) 0.758780 (0.0000) 0.946908 (0.0000) 1.325477 (0.0000)
 Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
 No. of observations 1937 1937 1504 1504
Panel B: Core inflation
 a^ 0.358212 (0.0000) 0.274911 (0.0000) 0.422821 (0.0000) 0.326668 (0.0000)
 b^ −0.062959 (0.4079) 0.392143 (0.0000) −0.673636 (0.0000) −0.197418 (0.0376)
 Prob(F-statistic) 0.407949 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
 No. of observations 1937 1937 1504 1504
Notes: p‑values in parenthesis.
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As can be seen in Table 5, our results indicate quite a 
significant persistence of inflation expectations, since the 
estimated autoregressive coefficients are very high (ranking 
from 0.8667 to 0.9295). In addition, expectations are 
positively related to the current core inflation and growth 
rates and the exchange rate. On the other hand, results also 
suggest a negative coefficient for ECB inflation target, while 
the coefficient for the ECB official short‑term interest rate 
is negative for k=3 and 9, and positive for k=9 and 12. 
Therefore, the PwC panel appears to incorporate the 
information content of a broad set of macroeconomic 
variables when forming their inflation expectations.
Notice that current inflation is determined by past 
decision and events, so the central bank current actions by 
traditional channels only have effects on future inflation. 
Some central banks have as intermediate target the inflation 
forecasts (Svensson, 1997). Since the lag control for 
monetary policy is close to 2 years, it would be of interest 
to test if the results obtained with the 3, 6, 9 and 12 months 
replicates when using a longer time horizon (for example 
2 years ahead). Although this exercise could shed some light 
on the credibility of the central bank actions and policy 
implications, it is not possible due data unavailability.
6. Concluding remarks
Expectations are essential for determining economic 
outcomes and for policymakers. Survey‑based measures of 
inflation provide point forecasts of inflation expectations at 
various horizons, covering both the short and medium to 
longer term. 
In this paper, we aim to provide a simple investigation of 
Spanish survey‑based inflation expectations. To that end, 
we have investigated predictive ability and consistency 
properties of inflation expectations using a survey conducted 
in Spain by PwC among a panel of experts and entrepreneurs, 
offering further evidence on the explanatory power of 
expectations directly observed from survey data.
Our results suggest that the PwC panel has some 
forecasting ability for time horizons from 3 to 9 months 
when tracking future general inflation rates, and improving 
when it comes to predicting the core inflation rate. 
Nevertheless, the results confirm that predictions made by 
Table 5 Determinants of the inflation expectations
 3-month ahead 6‑month ahead 9-month ahead 12-month ahead
ECB Inflation Target −0.141659 (0.0005) −0.295901 (0.0000) −0.132021 (0.0023) −0.222871 (0.0000)
Nominal Exchange Rate 0.243537 (0.0001) 0.516912 (0.0000) 0.270501 (0.0000) 0.442695 (0.0000)
Real Growth 0.004353 (0.0000) 0.007969 (0.0000) 0.004332 (0.0000) 0.005687 (0.0000)
Core Inflation Rate 0.069069 (0.0000) 0.108148 (0.0000) 0.073107 (0.0000) 0.097373 (0.0000)
Changes in ECB Official  
 Interest Rate 
−0.131426 (0.0006) 0.056819 (0.0815) −0.113218 (0.0057) 0.065507 (0.0542)
Lagged Inflation  
 Expectations
0.929534 (0.0000) 0.880365 (0.0000) 0.904352 (0.0000) 0.866727 (0.0000)
R-squared 0.961531 0.960168 0.931463 0.936204
Durbin-Watson stat 2.033311 1.907787 2.126202 1.924588
No. of observations 1936 1503 1936 1503
ECB, European Central Bank.
survey participants are neither unbiased nor efficient 
predictors of future inflation rates, regardless of the 
measurements of inflation used.
As for the consistency properties of the inflation 
expectations formation process, we find that panel members 
form stabilising expectations in the case of the headline 
inflation rate, both in the short and in the long‑run, although 
in the case of the core inflation rate, consistency remains 
indeterminate.
When considering a set of information variables that are 
relevant for predicting inflation and are available at the 
time the expectations are formed, we find that inflation 
expectations are very persistent, and that they are 
positively related to the current core inflation and the USD/
EUR exchange rate, but negatively related to ECB inflation 
target, while the sign of the coefficient for the ECB official 
short‑term interest rate depends on the forecast horizon.
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